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Self-Experience 
Abstract: Hume famously denied that he could experience the self. 
Most subsequent philosophers have concurred with this finding. I 
argue that if the subject is to function as a bearer of experience it must 
(1) lack sensory qualities in itself to be compatible with bearing 
sensory qualities and (2) be single so that it can unify experience. I 
use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the 
visual gap where one cannot see one’s own head. I argue that this 
open space conforms to the above criteria and hence is consistent with 
being the subject. I respond to the objection that this location is 
merely a lack of visual experience. I argue that this space also encom-
passes sound and touch properties and hence functions as a bearer for 
other sensory modalities. These first-person findings provide prima 
facie support for the view that the subject is a thin bearer of 
experience. 
1. Introduction 
What Am I? One may recognize the puzzle by asking: who or what is 
currently aware of the objects before me? I am aware of this computer 
screen, I am aware of my hands, I am aware of my body, I am aware 
of my thoughts and emotions. These are all objects of awareness 
(objects in a broad sense), and hence (phenomenally speaking) are not 
the ‘I’ that is presently aware of them (Albahari, 2006, pp. 7–12; 
Bond, 2005; Deikman, 1996; Edey, 1997). What is this experiencer? 
Methods for answering the question of what I am divide roughly 
into three approaches: third-person, first-person, and rational. The 
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third-person approach has been used to provide answers such as I am 
the organism (Olson, 1997; 2003; Snowdon, 1990; 2014), the brain, or 
brain parts (Hudson, 2001; Parfit, 2012; Puccetti, 1973). 
The first-person approach takes phenomenal experience as the 
starting point (Albahari, 2009; Edey, 1997; Evans, 1970; Dainton and 
Bayne, 2005; Deikman, 1996; Harding, 1961/1986; Strawson, 2009; 
Zahavi, 2005). Answers from this approach have included for-me-ness 
(Zahavi, 2005), and the subject is a bundle of experiences (apparently 
endorsed by Hume).2 In Eastern and meditative traditions the subject 
is pure awareness (Albahari, 2009; Deikman, 1996; Forman, 1999; 
Gupta, 1998; Shear, 1998), and has been described as being silent, 
still, and empty (Forman, 1999; Harding, 1961/1986; Shear, 1998; 
Shear and Jevning, 1999), while others drawing upon Indian Buddhist 
philosophy hold that there is no self at all (Dreyfus, 2011; Krueger, 
2011; MacKenzie, 2008; Rahula, 2007; Siderits, 2011). 
The rational approach, based upon reasoning (e.g. deductive and 
analogical reasoning), is the kind that was taken by Descartes and 
Leibniz in arguing for a substance view of the self. Their approach 
prioritized a priori deduction, though also drew upon the first-person 
perspective (see Swinburne, 1984, for a contemporary defence of sub-
stance dualism). The view that the self is created by brain processes or 
is a representational state (Churchland, 2002, chapter 3; Damasio, 
1994, pp. 236–44) is a form of analogical reasoning, usually based 
upon the computer metaphor of the mind, combined with the third-
person approach. The third-person perspective, in conjunction with 
analogical reasoning, has also been used to motivate the view that the 
self is an illusion produced by neural processes (Dennett, 1991; 
Metzinger, 2004). 
Here I will be using a combination of the first-person approach and 
the rational approach, but with an emphasis on first-person experi-
ence. In particular, I will be using a first-person experimental 
                                                          
2  Hume (1888/1978, p. 252): ‘I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are 
nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other 
with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.’ Given 
Hume’s empiricism, a question is whether Hume was making a metaphysical statement 
about the self or merely a statement about what is epistemically accessible while 
remaining neutral on metaphysics. 
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approach developed by Douglas Harding.3 Ultimately, we want all 
three routes to converge, but I set aside the third-person route here. 
An objection to the first-person approach is the denial that phenom-
enology entails metaphysics. Just because things seem a certain way it 
does not follow that they are that way. However, there are reasons for 
holding that phenomenal experience does provide a guide to meta-
physics when it comes to the subject. In fact, it is indispensable. As 
Strawson (1997) points out, first-person experience is the source of 
the problem of the self, so first-person experience is also the place to 
start in an investigation of the nature of the subject. Metaphysics is 
downstream of phenomenal experience. To ignore phenomenology in 
investigating the nature of the subject is like doing physics by 
analysing common-sense concepts of the physical — an entirely fruit-
less endeavour if you are interested in the way things actually are. The 
same reasoning applies to the subject of experience. How can I decide 
what I am if I am not even sure what it is like to be me? 
A first-person approach to the self, like any empirical approach, 
does not need to establish a necessary connection between experience 
and metaphysics. Rather, all that is needed is that it provides prima 
facie justification for the metaphysical thesis. It may still turn out that 
there is no self, the phenomenal facts may be undermined by further 
evidence, but there will at least be prima facie justification for holding 
that the self exists.4 
The first-person route reached a road block with David Hume when 
he proclaimed that he could find nothing in experience that corres-
ponded to a self. Introspecting his experience, Hume famously 
reported: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 
                                                          
3  Douglas Harding was a British philosopher and mystic. His main occupation was as an 
architect, although he also taught comparative religion at Cambridge. Though he wrote 
many books, his philosophy was developed almost exclusively outside of academia and 
is virtually unknown by philosophers. As far as I know, the only place his writings can 
be found in mainstream philosophy is in The Minds I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self 
and Soul (Hofstadter and Dennett, 1981) which presents excerpts from Harding (1961/ 
1986). His main work in philosophy was The Hierarchy of Heaven and Earth (Harding, 
1952/2011). His first-person experiments do not seem to have appeared in detail in any 
academic contexts. 
4  For defences of the prima facie justification supplied by experience see: Goldman 
(2004), Pryor (2000), Siewert (1998, chapter 1 and 2), Velmans (2007). 
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at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but 
the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by 
sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said to 
not exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I 
neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of 
my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is 
farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If anyone upon 
serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of 
himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him… He may, 
perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls 
himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Hume, 
1888/1978, 1.4.6, p. 152) 
Hume was not searching for just any phenomena in experience. He 
was looking for one that could play a very specific function of unify-
ing all of my experiences both synchronically (at one moment) and 
diachronically (over time). 
Hume’s failure to find a subject has been re-confirmed by most 
philosophers since.5 A salient example is Bertrand Russell who con-
curred with Hume that ‘we can easily become aware of our own 
experiences, but we seem to never become aware of the subject itself’ 
(Russell, 1914, p. 439). Contrary to Hume, I will argue that the subject 
can be experienced; that is, there can be a self-experience,6 with the 
assistance of appropriate methods. If successful, given the long history 
of philosophers who agree with Hume’s phenomenological findings, 
this would be a significant result. 
The main aim of the paper is identifying a phenomenal candidate for 
the subject of experience. My claim is that this candidate meets the 
criteria for being a thin bearer of experience. A thin bearer of experi-
ence cannot exist without experiences (see Strawson, 2009, pp. 323–
60, on ‘thin subjects’). This distinguishes it from thick bearers such as 
a face which can bear a grin but continues to exist without the grin 
(Armstrong, 1968/1992, p. 23). A thin bearer of experience is con-
trasted with thick bearers such as bodies and brains; however, this 
should not be read as implying that this type of subject is necessarily 
                                                          
5  Recent examples are: Dainton (2000, pp. 6, 57, 94), Giles (1993), Peacocke (2014, pp. 
44–57), Prinz (2012), Shoemaker (1987). 
6  By ‘self-experience’ I mean an experience of the self. However, I use the term ‘self-
experience’ to avoid connotations that in experiencing myself I necessarily experience 
myself as an object of awareness. I am influenced here by Galen Strawson (2009, pp. 
176–7). 
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disembodied, non-physical, or an immaterial substance (see the con-
cluding comments). 
Rather than argue for the necessary existence of the subject, the aim 
is to provide prima facie support for the reality of the subject. In 
particular, the argument is an inference to the best explanation. The 
convergence of rational considerations and phenomenological evi-
dence provides a reason for accepting the prima facie reality of the 
subject. 
The main focus will be on the visual modality. Hume’s claim that I 
cannot experience myself applies to all modalities, so finding a candi-
date self-experience using vision would be sufficient to negate this 
finding. I begin with the question of whether the looker can be 
visually experienced. Is there a bearer of visual experience? 
I extend the discussion to other sensory modalities in Section 6. I 
will also be focusing on the synchronic properties of the subject (that 
is, its unity at a single moment), rather than its diachronic properties 
(that is, its continuity over time). 
The outline for the paper is as follows: in Section 2, I use arguments 
to infer the characteristics required for a minimal subject of experi-
ence, and hence provide criteria for a self-experience. In Section 3, I 
make some preliminary phenomenological observations. In Section 4, 
I use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to show that 
there is a target of experience which fits the criteria for being the 
bearer of experience. In Section 5, I discuss how this experience 
differs from that of pure blind spots and gaps. I discuss other sensory 
modalities in Section 6. I respond to assorted objections in Section 7. I 
make some concluding comments in Section 8. 
2. Characteristics of the Subject 
To know what could count as a self-experience it is helpful to know 
what to look for. What properties must the subject of experience have 
in itself? Harding proposes that ‘to take on the shape of the hand that’s 
holding this book, you have to be free of shape; to take on its colour 
you have to be colourless; and to take on its opacity you have to be 
transparent; and to take on its complexity you have to be perfectly 
plain and clear’ (Harding, 1990/1999, pp. 51–2). If a subject is to be 
present with all experiences, that which takes them on, then it must be 
compatible with them. For example, if the phenomenal subject was 
coloured or shaped this would be incompatible with it taking on 
colours and shapes. If the subject was a red screen on which sensory 
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experience was projected then everything would be tinted red (Shear, 
1998). The subject must, in itself, be colourless, silent, tasteless, 
feelingless, and so forth.7 I understand ‘take on’ to mean subsume 
something ontologically, that is, to include something within itself as a 
part or property (see Bayne and Chalmers, 2003). I use ‘subsume’ and 
‘bear’ interchangeably. 
Another essential property of the subject, if it exists, is that it is 
single. A trivial sense of singularity of the subject comes from the way 
we use the term ‘subject’. It refers to a single being that has experi-
ences. A more substantial sense of subject singularity comes from the 
close connection between being a single subject and the unity of con-
sciousness.8 I see the blueness of the sky, hear the birds chirp, and feel 
the warmth of the sun simultaneously. It is plausible that an explana-
tion for the unity of consciousness will also explain the singularity of 
the experiencer and vice versa. This makes sense particularly if we 
understand the subject as being the bearer of experience. I would go 
further and say that phenomenally speaking experience is unified 
(synchronically and diachronically) because things, sounds, thoughts, 
and feelings are all presented to me. As Nida-Rümelin puts it: ‘The 
stream of consciousness is the totality of what is phenomenally 
given… to a subject in perception, emotion, bodily feeling, memory, 
imagination and thought, a totality which is in permanent change from 
moment to moment’ (Nida-Rümelin, 2014, p. 271). There are then a 
priori grounds for considering the subject single merely by the way 
the concept is used. There are also experiential grounds based upon 
the unity of consciousness, which also strongly suggest that the sub-
ject is necessarily single. 
                                                          
7  An anonymous reviewer asked: ‘What rules out a priori the idea that the subject might 
have phenomenal properties so pervasive, like the background hum of air conditioning, 
that we simply don’t register them?’ I find it hard to believe that I could experience 
sensory phenomenal properties that are impossible for me to notice. What would 
distinguish them from unconscious states? Presumably unattended sounds have a 
sensory phenomenal character, and so they contribute to overall experience. This means 
that they can interfere with other sounds, perhaps only very subtly (or perhaps only with 
other unattended sounds). The important point is that, whether we notice them or not, if 
any sensory phenomenal properties were built into the subject itself then it would inter-
fere with the subject functioning as a bearer for sensory phenomenal character within 
that modality. 
8  For definitions of the unity of consciousness, see Bayne (2010), Bayne and Chalmers 
(2003), Brook and Raymont (2014), Cleeremans (2003), Dainton (2000), and Tye 
(2003). 
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The above reasoning provides criteria for deciding whether an 
experience counts as a self-experience. In particular, to count as an 
experience of the bearer of experience the target should seemingly (1) 
have no sensory qualities and (2) be singular. The goal of experiments 
1–5 will be to show that is there is an experience in the visual 
modality conforming to the above characteristics. 
3. Preliminary Phenomenological Observations 
I begin with some preliminary phenomenological observations that we 
will be further exploring with first-person experiments. Can the sub-
ject be visually experienced? Not so according to Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus: 
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the 
world. 
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You 
will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. 
But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows 
you to infer that it is seen by an eye. (Wittgenstein, 1922, pp. 74–5) 
The subject cannot be found in the visual field. It cannot be experi-
enced as an object of vision, but he proposes that it is like its limits. 
This is suggestive as to where we might begin to look. Douglas 
Harding proposes that, instead of attending off to one side of the 
visual field, I should attend to the point I am apparently looking from. 
The breakthrough for Harding in terms of self-experience occurred 
when he came across a picture drawn by Ernst Mach (Figure 1). The 
image depicts Mach’s first-person self-portrait with one eye closed. In 
the background it shows a wall and a window, wooden floorboards, 
and shelves of books along the wall. In the middle ground can be seen 
Ernst Mach’s body, in particular, his shoes, wrinkled pants, waist-
coat, and arms, and right hand holding a pencil. In the foreground, on 
the right can be seen a large nose blur and handlebar moustache, and 
at the top an eyebrow. At the edges the image fades out. 
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Figure 1. Ernst Mach’s first-person self-portrait (Mach, 1890, p. 59). 
This first-person portrait is so striking because it provides a depiction 
of what it is like to be me that is very different from how I appear to 
others. Most salient is the lack of a head in the picture. Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/2002, p. 108) has also pointed out this obvious fact: ‘In the 
matter of living appearance, my visual body includes a large gap at the 
level of the head.’ 
Take some time to investigate it for yourself. Look down at your 
body. I find that my legs, torso, and arms are given visually, but that 
my head is not. There is nothing visually above my shoulders. 
Actually my back is also visually absent and the rest of my body often 
disappears from the scene, and one wall of the room is presently 
visually missing. Harding describes his vivid version of this experi-
ence in the setting of the Himalayas: 
What actually happened was something absurdly simple and unspec-
tacular: just for the moment I stopped thinking. Reason and imagination 
and all mental chatter died down. For once words really failed me. I 
forgot my name, my humanness, my thingness, all that could be called 
me or mine. Past and future dropped away. It was as if I had been born 
that instant, brand new, mindless, innocent of all memories. There 
existed only the Now, that present moment and what was clearly given 
in it. To look was enough. And what I found was khaki trouser legs 
terminating downwards in a pair of brown shoes, khaki sleeves termina-
ting sideways in a pair of pink hands, and a khaki shirtfront terminating 
upwards in — absolutely nothing whatever! Certainly not in a head. It 
took me no time at all to realise that this nothing, this hole where a head 
should have been, was no ordinary vacancy, no mere nothing. On the 
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contrary, it was very much occupied. It was a vast emptiness vastly 
filled, a nothing that found room for everything — room for grass, trees, 
shadowy distant hills, and far above them snow peaks like a row of 
angular clouds riding the blue sky. I had lost a head and gained a world. 
(Harding, 1961/1986, pp. 1–2) 
It is important to point out here that this is an exercise in phenomenol-
ogical description. This is not a claim about myself as a human being. 
Of course, ‘I’ (in the human personal sense) have a head. I also see my 
face in a mirror. Knowing what I look like to others is central to my 
identity as a person. However, I am enquiring here into my identity as 
experiencer. What I find when I look in the mirror is that the face is 
over there in the glass about a metre away, not here on my shoulders 
(of my experienced body). It is also facing the wrong direction. 
Some will object that they can see their nose. But what kind of nose 
does it seem to be? I find that it seems to be a large pink translucent 
blur that stretches from the top to the bottom of the scene. It is 
continually appearing and disappearing. In fact there seem to be two 
of them. They tend to appear one at a time on opposite sides of the 
scene. What are these blurs apparently attached to on present 
evidence? Again I seemingly find nothing, or a gap. There are also 
various aches, tickles, and other such facial sensations and proprio-
ception of ‘head’ position. Where are these occurring in present 
experience? Do they seem to be occurring on the surface of, or 
qualifying, an opaque spherical object with eyes, mouth, hair, and 
ears? 
4. First-Person Experiments 
4.1. Methodology 
The following are a series of first-person experiments. They are not 
thought experiments, but an investigation of your first-person experi-
ence as it is given. If they are not carried out then this paper will not 
make any sense. It is integral that during the following awareness 
exercises you go by how things seem rather than how you think or 
imagine they are. That is, at least for the moment, you attempt to 
describe your experience exactly as it is given. There is nothing 
mysterious about taking on this ‘phenomenal attitude’. An example is 
when I describe the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion as seeming to be 
unequal in length even though I believe that they are actually equal in 
length. 
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Harding’s procedure also uses a method of phenomenal contrast. 
Here two phenomena are compared so as to make salient the 
phenomenal difference between them. Such a first-person method is 
also advocated by Susanna Siegel (2007). The goal of the experiments 
is to use apparatus (such as hands) as an aid for making a contrast 
between viewed objects and the apparent viewer of those objects, in 
particular for setting up the phenomena that are to be contrasted, and 
for orienting attention to the target phenomenon.9 
4.2. The Experiments 
 Experiment 1: Exploring the Gap 
Hold up your hands in front of you as if you were holding a basket-
ball. Now slowly bring them towards yourself, past your ears. Notice 
how your hands seem to grow larger (in the sense of taking up more of 
the visual field), and the gap between them also grows. They begin to 
blur and finally disappear altogether into an apparent void here. 
Bringing them forwards again, watch as they reappear from the gap. 
Repeat this a few times to get a sense of what this seemingly empty 
region is like.10 
 Experiment 2: Tracing Out the Field of View 
How many eyes do you seem to be looking out of on present experi-
ence? Do you seem to be looking out of two small windows in a head 
or a single large opening? How large does the gap seem? Does it seem 
to be head-sized? Put your arms out and trace out the edge of the 
visual field. I find that the gap is seemingly as large as the scene. This 
SPACE11 seemingly encompasses the room from wall to wall. Also 
notice that the visual field has nothing discernible outside of it. Use 
your finger to trace out the boundary of a chair or some other object. 
Notice that it is in a surrounding environment such as a room. Again 
trace out the boundaries of this visual field. Does it have a visibly 
                                                          
9  The experiments used here all come from Douglas Harding (or workshops by Richard 
Lang), with the exception of experiment 5 which is my own development on Harding’s 
experimental method. 
10  See Harding (1996, p. 5) for a version of this experiment. 
11  By ‘space’ I do not mean the space of physics, but rather I use it as a descriptive term in 
the sense of a gap or opening, and also in terms of it seemingly functioning as room or 
capacity (in a container sense) for the scene. From here on, ‘space’ will appear in small 
caps when I am using it in this special sense of the term. 
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discernible surrounding environment? Or does it visually have nothing 
outside of it?12 Finally, is there one gap or multiple gaps? I only find 
one. That is, it is phenomenally singular. 
 Experiment 3: The Frame Experiment 
Use your fingers to form a frame through which you can look. Com-
pare your fingers to what is in the finger-frame. Notice that your 
fingers are coloured and opaque. You cannot see through your fingers, 
but the interior of the frame is transparent. Your fingers frame a gap. 
Also notice how when you move the frame around it contains any-
thing in the room: doors, books, parts of walls. It is because the frame 
is empty that it is able to act as a capacity for things. Does this also 
apply to what you seem to be looking out of? To test this, slowly bring 
the frame back (towards where others see your face). Notice how your 
fingers seem to grow larger as they come closer, and how the gap in 
the frame also gets larger, and thus encompasses more of the room. 
Keep attending to the gap, bring the frame all the way back, and let 
your fingers drop. Notice that the gap is phenomenally identical to that 
of the finger-frame, except that unlike the gap in the finger-frame it 
has no discernible boundaries.13 
 Experiment 4: The Pointing Experiment 
Look at your finger and notice that it has colour, shape, texture, 
wrinkles, etc. It is obviously a thing. Now with this thing, by pointing, 
direct your attention to a far wall. Notice that your finger (a thing, 
with shape, colour, and extension) is pointing at another thing, with 
shape, colour, and extension. Also notice that your finger and the wall 
are separated by a gap. Now point to the floor. Notice the patterns, 
colours, and textures. Now point to your foot. Once again you are 
pointing at a shaped and coloured thing. Now, very slowly, tracing 
your pointing finger up your body, notice that this pattern of duality 
between object and object persists. Finger — gap — legs. Finger — 
gap — stomach. Finger — gap — chest. Now bring your finger up in 
line with where others see your face. Finger — gap — ??? From your 
present experience, is your finger pointing at an object, a thing? Does 
there seem to be a head or face here? Continue pointing and please go 
                                                          
12  Thank you to Richard Lang for introducing this experiment to me. 
13  This is a version of the Card Experiment, in which you use a card with a head-sized 
hole in it. See for example Harding (1990/1999, pp. 114–6). 
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through this checklist. What is your finger pointing at? Do there seem 
to be: (1) Any colours here? (2) Any shape here? (3) Any texture 
here? (4) Any wrinkles here? (5) Any movement here? Is it true to say 
that this SPACE seems to encompass everything on show, including 
your finger, hand, arm, body, and the room? Finally, aren’t you also 
apparently pointing at the viewer or at least the looker?14 
4.3. Overview of Results 
The goal of the experiments was to bring attention back to what it is 
like to be the looker in your own experience. Common sense says that 
I am looking out of a head — an opaque, solid thing. That is, I am a 
thing in the world that looks at other things. The results of the experi-
ment were in complete contrast to common sense. What I found was: 
1. This spot seems to be lacking in colours, and shapes. The experi-
ence is as of transparency rather than opaqueness. 
2. There seems to be one gap here. It seems single. 
3. The SPACE here seemingly encompasses or is full of the scene. 
4. The field of view does not seem to be in anything. 
5. When I point here I seem to be pointing at myself, or at least the 
looker. 
When I attend to where I am apparently looking from, I find no visual 
features. Recall that lack of colour, shape, etc. is exactly what was 
predicted to be a defining characteristic (or lack of characteristic) of 
the minimal subject. It is also seemingly single. There is only one gap. 
This was the second predicted characteristic of the subject. The target 
of experience fits the criteria of the bearer of experience as outlined in 
Section 2. This was an experience in which the target seemingly (1) 
has no sensory qualities, and (2) is singular. These were characteristics 
which were inferred to be required for the target to function as the 
bearer of experience. 
I also seem to be looking from here. There is a sense that I am here 
(a sense of self). This provides another motivation for holding that this 
open SPACE is me. The SPACE also apparently encompasses the visual 
scene which is consistent with it being the bearer of visual experience. 
                                                          
14  This is a form of meditation. The experiment is most effective if you do not rush 
through it. I suggest forgetting philosophy for a short while — relax, sit quietly, and 
point here for at least 30 seconds. For examples of the pointing experiment see: Harding 
(1990/1999, pp. 8–9, 41–2; 2000, pp. 8–9), Lang (2003, pp. 7–8). 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
17
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 154 B.J.  RAMM 
So far, however, all that follows is that this is a bearer of visual 
experience, not necessarily the bearer of experience. I investigate 
other sensory modalities in Section 6. 
5. Blind Spots and Gaps 
According to common sense there is nothing special about this spot, it 
is just a visual blind spot. My eyes do not look backwards, so of 
course there is nothing to see HERE.15 Perhaps we can say that HERE is 
just a pure visual absence. I am pointing outside the visual field, and 
thus of course what I find is a lack of visual experience, a visual 
blank. It is natural then to explain this phenomenon as merely a pure 
visual absence. 
There is something right about calling THIS a visual absence, but 
what kind is it? Take, for instance, a blind spot where I cannot see a 
car because it is behind a truck. I see the truck but not the car. This is 
a blind spot by occlusion. There is also a visual blind spot where the 
optic nerve passes through the retina. The blind location is filled in by 
the other eye so that we do not typically notice the loss of information. 
It is important to note that these types of visual absences are not seen 
as nothing but have a sensory phenomenal character. Even the 
nothingness of outer space appears black and not as a pure absence. 
This gap is not like this, nor like any other direction. Neither is it a 
‘perception of absence’ of an expected object, such as when I see the 
absence of my laptop on the desk when it has been stolen 
(Farennikova, 2013). Other types of absences are holes and gaps. For 
example, I experience the gap where something is missing, and there 
is a character of emptiness to the experience. These are blind spots by 
vacancy. Finally, there is a blind spot where there is a complete lack 
of experience altogether. This type of absence has no phenomenal 
character — it is a pure blind spot. Is there a complete lack of visual 
experience when you attend to the location from which you are 
looking? We can answer this question by contrasting what it is like to 
attend to this location with what it is like to attend outside of your 
visual field on the horizontal axis (i.e. in the left and right directions). 
                                                          
15  Throughout the remainder of the text, when I use ‘here’ and ‘this’ in small caps the 
reader should assume that I am referring to the visual gap from which one seems to be 
looking. 
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Experiment 5: Pure Blind Spots, Absences, and the Aware Spot 
(A) Blind Spot by Vacancy: Look directly ahead and move your hand 
slowly to the left. Notice that your hand begins to look blurry and 
eventually visibly disappears altogether. You have found the 
‘edge’ of your visual field. Off the edge of the visual field, I find 
a true blind spot, a pure visual absence. If I merely experience 
nothing from where I am looking, if it is an absolute absence of 
experience, then what it is like to attend HERE should be exactly 
the same as there. Point off to the side and attend to that location. 
I find that I am pointing at nothing whatsoever, no things, no 
colours, no shapes. This is as close to a bare nothing as I can find. 
The visual field just ends. Now by contrast point HERE. There is a 
tangible phenomenal difference between the two spots. I am 
again apparently pointing at no thing, colour, or shape, but there 
is also an experience of spacious emptiness. It is like a hole. 
There is something it is like to experience this location. 
(B) The Aware Spot: Point to the gap formed by an open doorway. In 
a sense I am pointing at nothing. I seem to be pointing at no 
shapes or colours and not at the looker. Now point HERE. There is 
a phenomenal difference between the gap of the door way and 
HERE. Again there are apparently no shapes and colours, but I 
also seem to be pointing at the looker. THIS does not merely seem 
to be a gap. I am seemingly pointing at where I am looking from, 
the locus of awareness. A gap in a doorway has a spacious empti-
ness to it simpliciter. By contrast, when I attend HERE there is 
simultaneously (1) a spacious emptiness and (2) a sense that I am 
here/looking from here. It is an ‘Aware-Space’ (Harding, 1996, p. 
83; 1988/2001, p. 135). 
This spot can certainly be categorized as a type of visual absence in 
that it lacks colours and shapes. However, as there is a character of 
emptiness when I attend HERE, this is not an absence of experience. Is 
it merely a gap in the visual field? Most gaps are defined by 
boundaries in the visual field. For example, the gap in a doorway is 
defined by a door frame. This ‘gap’ is special, however, in that it has 
no frame. There is nothing apparently outside of it. Unlike other gaps 
it cannot be destroyed by changing the environment such as when I 
close an open door. Rather than being in the visual field, it 
encompasses the entire visual field. It is also experienceable at all 
times. I can experience it even with my eyes closed. Furthermore, it 
encompasses all other perceived gaps. If it is a gap it seems to be the 
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Ur-gap. If what I argue here is correct, it is the bearer of visual space 
and so all other gaps depend upon it. 
This SPACE also has positive properties. It is not seemingly a mere 
gap or mere absence. As already mentioned this space seems to 
encompass the scene. Also importantly, I seem to be looking from 
here. There is a sense of self-presence. I seem to be a capacity for the 
scene. I conclude then that THIS is not a pure visual absence but rather 
is the best candidate for myself that I can find.16 
Harding refers to THIS location as a ‘visibly boundless Space’ 
(Harding, 1988/2001, p. 109). I read ‘visibly’ as saying that there is 
something it is like to experience it. In particular, there is a character 
of emptiness to the experience. This is an important finding. As 
Dainton points out, phenomenal character need not be exhausted by 
sensory qualities such as visual, auditory, and tactile properties: 
The notion of phenomenal character need not be restricted to qualities 
of this sort. A consciousness which consists of nothing but a feeling of 
void-like emptiness has a definite (if difficult to describe) phenomenal 
character. An ‘awareness’ of this kind is tangible rather than pure, even 
if it is natural to describe it as ‘pure’. By contrast, a truly bare Aware-
ness has absolutely no phenomenal character of any kind, and so is 
subjectively indistinguishable from non-existence. (Dainton, 2002, pp. 
45–6) 
This reasoning about awareness also applies to the subject. If there is 
nothing it is like to experience myself apart from the properties of 
sensory qualities, then Hume is correct that a unique self-experience 
does not exist. If, however, there is a unique phenomenal character 
involved in apprehending myself, then self-experience is indeed 
possible. The subject can then make a phenomenal difference. I found 
that this was indeed the case. 
6. Other Sensory Modalities 
Experiments 1–5 investigated what it is like to be the looker using the 
visual modality. The looker seemed to be a space-for-the-visual-scene. 
Does this result generalize to the experiencer? The experiencer does 
not just see, but also hears, smells, feels, etc. Suppose someone 
                                                          
16  See Lewis and Lewis (1970) on the metaphysics of holes. Sorenson (2007) theorizes 
that the self is a kind of absence and touches on many points that I discuss here. I differ 
from Sorenson in emphasizing the affinities between this ‘absence’ and substance 
theories of the self. 
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accepts that they can distinguish a SPACE here which functions as a 
bearer for the visual field. This would not be sufficient to count as the 
experiencer unless it encompassed all sensory modalities. The 
objection is that the experiments do not provide a phenomenally 
singular experiencer, and hence it provides an inadequate candidate 
for the subject of experience. Certainly the gap here is experienced 
visually (as a lack of colours and shapes), but is it merely 
encompassing the visual scene? 
As an initial observation, I do not just experience the coffee cup that 
I pick up as white, and cup-shaped, but as feeling hard and warm, and 
that felt hardness and warmth is out there with the cup — perfectly 
integrated with the visual features. I find that this SPACE seems to 
encompass not just visually experienced properties and objects but 
that it includes properties from other sensory modalities. Consider also 
when someone speaks, the sound is not just an additional element, but 
is heard as coming from their mouth. I do not experience a separate 
field of sound layered on top of the visual field. Certainly I do not 
always hear sounds at the same time as visually experiencing a scene 
(for example when I hear things behind me), but this does not show 
that there are separable fields, only that some of the contents of the 
single multimodal phenomenal field can occur without others. We will 
investigate this further in the next experiment. 
Experiment 6: Eyes Closed 
Close your eyes. Attend to your bodily sensations. Now attend to one 
of your hands. Going by present experience, how many fingers does it 
have? Can you feel five distinct digits, or is what you feel shapeless, 
and changing? How many ears do you have on present evidence? 
What shape is your face? Do you have a well defined face, or various 
fleeting sensations that you associate with a face? Would you even 
know what a face was if you had never seen or touched one? How 
large is your body? Are you in a body on present evidence? Is there 
any separation between your ‘bodily sensations’ and those of your 
clothes and the chair in which you are sitting? Where are the 
boundaries of your body? Are there any boundaries between your 
bodily sensations and the darkness? 
Now listen to sounds. Some are near and some are far. Some are 
loud and some are soft. They arise and then are gone again. There is 
also a silence. Some describe this by saying that thoughts and sounds 
are arising in the silence. Attend to your thoughts. Count in your 
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mind. Is there a boundary between your thoughts and the sounds of 
the room? Are these thoughts happening in a box (a head)? I find that 
thoughts, sounds, and bodily sensations make up one field of experi-
ence. Is that true for you? Now slowly open your eyes and watch the 
room reappear. Your phenomenal world is once again flooded with 
colours and shapes. 
In this experiment I found that my thoughts, bodily sensations, and 
the sounds all occur in a single awareness. The visual, bodily, and 
auditory elements are unified in a single experiential field.17 
Although vision is the most salient means of access, I find that the 
field-like experience of myself is not limited to the visual modality. 
There is also a silence in which thoughts and sounds arise. The experi-
ence of emptiness is not limited to the visual modality. This void-like 
character of self-experience has been reported on many occasions 
within meditative traditions. As an example, describing the character 
of emptiness from the auditory modality Robert Forman states: 
From that moment forward, I was silent inside. I don’t mean I didn’t 
think, but rather that the feeling inside of being me was like being 
entirely empty, a perfect vacuum. Since that time all of my thinking, my 
sensations, my emotions, etc., has been on a silent background. 
(Forman, 1999, p. 142) 
It seems fair to say that the silence seems to be associated with that 
which is aware. I can say that unhesitatingly about my own experience. 
What is aware is precisely the silence. (ibid., pp. 150–1) 
A lot more can be said about other sensory modalities. However, my 
preliminary conclusion is that this SPACE also functions as a bearer of 
other sensory properties, and hence meets the criteria for being the 
bearer of experience. The character of emptiness in experiencing 
myself is also available in other sensory modalities, particularly as a 
background silence. 
7. Assorted Objections 
Perhaps the phenomenological evidence can be explained away. For 
example, one may hold that this experience is merely of a visual gap 
that has nothing to do with the subject, and that the sense of self-
                                                          
17  See Tye (2003) on the single experience view in which there is only one single multi-
modal phenomenal field from which we abstract out fields of different modalities. On 
this view the question of whether there are different bearers for each sensory modality 
would not even arise. 
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presence is merely co-located with the gap. It may be an unfortunate 
outcome of the procedure of this paper that it gives the impression that 
there are separable components of ‘spaciousness’ and ‘self-presence’. 
The problem with language is that it artificially isolates components 
such as shape and colour which are in fact experienced inseparably. 
Similarly, the basic pre-theoretical, non-verbal present experience is I-
am-space-for-the-scene-thoughts-sounds (etc.). This self-experience is 
a single indivisible unity. I suggest that it is like the sky seeming to be 
blue. The blueness does not seem to be merely co-located with the sky 
— it seems to be blue. Similarly, this open SPACE seems to be me. 
Hence I do not think that such attempts at reduction can do justice to 
the phenomenology. 
An objection from photography is that a photograph of a cityscape 
also has a viewpoint and the paper also encompasses the image. We 
do not think that a photo is a subject, so why think that these 
properties I share with a photograph entail the existence of a subject in 
my own case? Furthermore, if the photograph counts as a subject then 
this is a reductio of my position. A photograph is a visual representa-
tion of a subject’s visual field but does not count as a subject because 
there is presumably nothing it is like to be the photograph. It is not a 
bearer of experience. It could be argued that a photograph does not 
even bear colours, rather it reflects light and it only has colours for a 
subject. On the other hand, this SPACE encompasses experienced 
properties. Furthermore, the photograph presumably has no sense of 
self-presence built in. Neither can egocentric properties such as the 
viewpoint explain this sense of being aware. A mere central point in 
visual space does not explain why I seem to be located HERE rather 
than elsewhere. There are, then, critical differences between one’s 
own case and visual representations of a perspective.18 
Perhaps this open space only exists whenever I attend HERE. Is this 
an unusual state of experience which does not extend to ordinary 
states of consciousness? Is the act of attending inwards somehow 
creating this SPACE? Certainly without attending HERE I would not 
have this experience of spacious emptiness. However, my contention 
is that this is what I am whether I am aware of it or not. A reason for 
holding this, apart from the arguments of Section 2, is that to experi-
ence the world I need to be open to it. If my head, face, or eyes got in 
                                                          
18  A closely related topic is Williams’ (1973) classic discussion of imagined visual per-
spectives. I do not discuss imagination here as this adds yet further complications. 
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the way (i.e. appeared in the visual field) I could not experience my 
friend’s face. I need to be built open to receive their face, whether I 
am aware of it or not. The experiments purportedly reveal my original 
condition; they do not create a new one. I become aware of the fact 
that the lived relationship between myself and others is face-to-space, 
never face-to-face (Harding, 2000, p. 17). The same applies to other 
the senses. I feel the cat’s fur not my hand stroking it. I hear the bell 
not my ear drum. The experiencing subject is never an object for 
itself, but rather always entirely open to the world (for a classic 
discussion see Sartre, 1943/1956, pp. 303–5). 
Why take the experience described in this paper as the fundamental 
type of self-awareness rather than bodily experience? There is for 
example proprioception, the sense of the position of my limbs. Is this 
a form of self-awareness? If so, does this conflict with the current 
findings? In fact, there are many types of self-awareness. The 
meanings of ‘self’ and ‘I’ are multivocal (for a defence see Strawson, 
2009, pp. 331–3). My sense of having a body is essential to my every-
day interactions with people and the world. This, including how I 
appear to others, is part of my third-person identity. However, seem-
ing to be ‘in’ a body with a precise shape and boundaries is plausibly 
more to do with imagination than sensory experience. For example, 
when I feel what I call a ‘headache’ there is certainly an ache, but 
somatically speaking my ‘head-experience’ is partial, vague in 
boundaries, dynamically changing, and has no clear shape. I certainly 
associate these sensations with head parts, but there is little that is 
head-like about the actual feel of them.19 
There is also my first-person identity, how I seem for myself, which 
is not always recognized. The scene, my thoughts, and my bodily 
experience all occur in this spacious awareness, or so is my experi-
ence. This first-person identity is seemingly that which unifies all of 
the different types of self-awareness including the sense of embodi-
ment and sense of personhood. I could conceivably lose my sense of 
embodiment and personhood and still be this subject to which things 
                                                          
19  Do these various head sensations block up the SPACE in some sense? There are two 
points to note in response. Firstly, as these feels are colourless they do not interfere with 
the SPACE functioning as a capacity for visual scenes. Secondly, the specific feelings at a 
particular location in the experiential space are constantly changing. As a specific 
feeling at time T could be replaced by a different feeling at that location (or none at all), 
those specific feels are not essential properties of the experiential space. In principle, 
that particular location can function as a capacity for any feeling. 
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are presented. This is what I need to minimally be me. It is what I 
seem to be at the centre of my phenomenal world. Hence, I take the 
self-experience investigated here to be compatible with other types of 
self-awareness, at the same time as being the most fundamental type 
of self-awareness. 
8. Concluding Comments 
The question of this paper was whether there was an experienceable 
candidate for the subject of experience. I used reasoning and phenom-
enological considerations to infer that a minimal synchronic subject (a 
bearer of experience) should be lacking in sensory qualities in itself 
and single. This provided criteria for what the experience should be 
like to count as a minimal self-experience. With the assistance of 
experiments designed by Douglas Harding I found that there is such 
an experience. I seem to be looking out of a gap. This open SPACE 
apparently lacks sensory qualities and is seemingly single. I also 
found that this SPACE encompasses other sensory properties; that is, it 
functions as a bearer of experience in general. Neither does it seem to 
be a mere gap, as I seem to be looking from here. It is an aware-space. 
As the experience meets the criteria for being a self-experience, it 
hence provides prima facie justification for the reality of the subject. 
Even if there seems to be a subject it does not follow that there is a 
subject. How exactly does one move from phenomenal experience to 
metaphysics? The answer I offered was that there does not need to be 
a necessary connection between phenomenology and metaphysics. 
Rather, all that needs to be claimed is that the experience provides 
prima facie justification for believing that this is me. My experience is 
that I am a capacity for the scene, thoughts, and feelings. If this is also 
true for you, then as empiricists this should be our default starting 
position on the nature of the self until proven otherwise. This is a form 
of empirical dogmatism (Pryor, 2000), in a broad sense of ‘empirical’. 
This justification is bolstered by the independent considerations on 
the nature of the subject as discussed in Section 2. In the reverse 
direction, the experience provides a prima facie verification of the 
hypothesis that there is a bearer of experience. As the experience and 
the rational considerations were arrived at independently of each other 
they can be used as mutually supporting sources of justification 
(Goldman, 2004, pp. 5–6). The phenomenological and rational routes 
converge on the same conclusion. 
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The current findings suggest that Hume, and most others since, 
failed in the search for the experiencer because they were attending in 
the wrong direction. They were attending outwards when they should 
have attended inwards. In fact, it is common within meditative 
traditions to hold that the method for recognizing the essential nature 
of one’s self requires a reversal of attention away from the objects of 
experience (Shear and Jevning, 1999, pp. 190–1). Harding provides 
precise instructions on how to do this: attend 180 degrees from the 
black markings on the page you are currently seeing to who or what is 
apparently seeing them. 
This SPACE does not seem to be a body or brain. I take these first-
person findings to hence provide prima facie support for the thesis 
that the subject is a thin bearer of experience. This is a version of the 
substance view of the self. However, I generally avoid the term 
‘substance’ because for many it is synonymous with bare particulars 
and substance dualism, both of which I reject. The substance view of 
the self does not commit one to the existence of particulars without 
properties — ‘bare particulars’ — which would be paradoxical.20 I 
prefer the term ‘thin subject’ or ‘thin bearer of experience’ which is a 
subject that necessarily has experiences (Strawson, 2009). 
In fact, most of the objections to the substance view apply 
specifically to substance dualism (Olson, 2007, pp. 164–8). However, 
the existence of a thin subject does not entail the possibility of dis-
embodied free-floating subjects. Alternatives to substance dualism are 
substance monist views such as idealism and panpsychism. I find 
panpsychism to be the most plausible theory of consciousness on 
independent grounds (Chalmers, 2015; Goff, 2017; Strawson, 2006). 
Science tells us about the structural-dispositional nature of physical 
things, but not what they are intrinsically, in themselves (Eddington, 
1928; Russell, 1927/2007, pp. 263–4). A panpsychist substance 
monism can avoid the pitfalls of substance dualism by positing that 
conscious substances are the intrinsic nature of physical entities. The 
in itself is the for itself (Harding, 1952/2011, p. 116; William James in 
his unpublished notes: Perry, 1935, p. 446). Furthermore, accepting a 
thin bearer of experience does not entail that the subject is soul-like in 
the sense of being atomistic and separate from other subjects. Subjects 
may overlap or perhaps there is ultimately only one Self or 
                                                          
20  Sider (2006) provides a defence of the intelligibility of substances (substratum), and 
even allows for the possibility of bare particulars. 
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Consciousness, as held in the tradition of the Perennial Philosophy 
(Albahari, forthcoming; Harding, 1952/2011: see also Goff, forth-
coming, on cosmopsychism). 
There is nothing new in the present first-person findings. Reference 
to the void-like nature of the self (or Self) is found in many Eastern 
and mystical traditions (Forman, 1999; Harding, 1961/1986; Shear, 
1998; Shear and Jevning, 1999). These diverse first-person investiga-
tions across many cultures, ancient and contemporary, describe one’s 
own essential nature (Self in Advaita Vedanta or Buddha-Nature in 
Buddhism) as empty, still, and void.21 Harding’s experiments shed 
light on these otherwise mysterious reports. However, his methods are 
not ‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ at all, but coldly scientific. Rather, they 
provide systematic and repeatable means for investigating what I am 
for myself. 
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